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The Antitrust Bulletin/Summer 1979
JOINT VENTURES AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
by
JOSEPH F. BRODLEY*
Writing in this journal in 1976 I described the law of joint
ventures as "one of the darkest corners of antitrust"'-a situa-
tion caused in no small part by the absence of recent antitrust
precedents. Penetrating the darkness, the Antitrust Guide for
International Operations' is a welcome addition to antitrust
jurisprudence, since almost a third of its specific substantive
discussion involves joint ventures. To be sure, the discussion
focuses on joint ventures in international trade, where special
problems exist not replicated in domestic markets,' and much
of the discussion concerns the legality of collateral agreements
rather than joint ventures as such. Nevertheless, the analysis
of joint ventures has relevance not confined to international
markets or embedded collateral agreements, and hence what
the Antitrust Guide has to say provides added illumination in
a difficult area. Moreover, since the Antitrust Guide is a
* Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the An-
titrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453
(1976) (hereafter cited as Brodley, Joint Ventures).
2 ANTITRUST DIVISION U.S. DEPART. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977) (hereafter referred to as Antitrust
Guide), reprinted in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 266, Pt. 11 (1977).
(Citations are to the CCH reprint.)
' E.g., antitrust jurisdiction over foreign commerce, comity, Act
of State doctrine, Webb-Pomerene Act and international agree-
ments between governments.
4 This has been made explicit by a policy spokesman for the Anti-
trust Division, who states that much of the legal analysis, including
that directly applicable to at least two of the specific cases discussed
(Cases C and D), is "essentially identical to that which would apply
© 1979 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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statement of enforcement policy, it can be useful in assessing
the outer boundaries of possible governmental challenge, for
surely a joint venture which is questionable in the possibly
less hostile environment of international trade would be at
least equally suspect if it occurred solely in domestic markets.
In my previous article on joint ventures I concluded that
the classification of a joint venture with respect to the
parents' market, as horizontal, vertical or conglomerate, was
of explanatory importance. More specifically, as between
parents with high market shares who are competitors or
potential competiiors in concentrated markets-(1) a horizon-
tal joint venture was inevitably suspect; (2) a market exten-
sion joint venture organized on a permanent basis was equally
suspect where the parents together held a dominant market
position; (3) a vertical joint venture involving the marketing of
a product produced by both parents was also questionable
(although the legal authority for this conclusion was sparse);
and (4) a pure conglomerate or pure product extension joint
venture was unlikely to raise antitrust problems under ex-
isting precedents.' As between high market share parents, this
left as the areas of greatest legal doubt (1) limited term
market extensions; (2) market extensions as to one parent
only; and (3) upstream vertical joint ventures. Strikingly, it is
precisely on these areas that the Antitrust Guide focuses.
in a domestic antitrust case." Donald A. Farmer, Jr., remarks before
a seminar sponsored by the Council of the Americas in Cleveland,
Ohio (June 8, 1977), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,325,
at 55,689. See also Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Antitrust Enforcement: A
Positive Force for Innovation, remarks before Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers, at Arlington, Virginia (Sept. 20, 1978) at
pp. 8-9.
5 Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 456-472.
Id. at 467-468; 477-478.
338
JOINT VENTURES
The core antitrust doctrine applied in the Antitrust Guide
is the rule of reason, and this in itself invites close attention
in view of the increased emphasis placed on the rule in recent
Supreme Court decisions.' Reliance on the rule of reason,
moreover, sharply differentiates the Antitrust Guide from the
1968 Merger Guidelines, which rested extensively on presump-
tive rules. In place of such explicit rules, the Antitrust Guide
has substituted a series of short factual scenarios, called
"cases," followed by brief, often conclusory, comment.8
What general rules the Antitrust Guide does articulate are
stated in such general terms as to give little legal guidance.
Thus, the core doctrine of the rule of reason is phrased in
broad language, which while familiar to readers, will scarcely
resolve hard cases. The Guide's articulation of the rule touches
the familiar bases of whether the alleged anticompetitive
restraint is "ancillary to a lawful main purpose," whether its
scope and duration are no greater then necessary to achieve
See, Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) and National Soc'y. of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
8 The term "cases" perhaps claims too much, for while the tran-
sactions described in the Guide are based on actual occurrences (see
Seki, The Justice Department's New Antitrust Guide for Interna-
tional Operations-A Summary and Evaluation, 32 Bus. LAWYER
1633 (1977)), the facts are simplified and incomplete, and the com-
ment is frequently hedged. Perhaps for this reason there is a steril-
ity and lifelessness in the cases, a one-dimensionality caused by the
loss of contextual depth.
For a good general assessment of the impact of the Antitrust
Guide on antitrust enforcement in international trade see Fugate,
The Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide for International
Operations, 17 VA. J. IN'L L. 645 (1977) (hereafter cited as Fugate,
Antitrust Guide). See also Douglas E. Rosenthal, Remarks to the
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Committee, U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce (March 9, 1977), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
150,309; Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's Antitrust
Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215 (1978);
and Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL
INT'L. L.J. 255 (1978).
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that purpose, and whether the restriction is otherwise reason-
able in light of all relevant facts and circumstances.'
The Department's enforcement policies are not, however,
revealed in such general formulations, but rather in the
discussion of the specific cases, of which four involve joint
ventures.10 The cases involve joint ventures between com-
petitors or potential competitors1' in concentrated markets,
engaging in either limited term market extensions, unlimited
term partial market extensions or upstream vertical joint ven-
tures. These will be discussed in turn.
LIMITED TERM MARKET EXTENSIONS
In a market extension joint venture, parents engaged in
the same product line form a joint venture to enter a new
geographic market. Market extension joint ventures between
major producers holding large market shares have been suc-
cessfully challenged in prior joint venture decisions on essen-
tially two theories: (1) injury to potential competition through
9 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 3-4. This articulation follows
closely McLaren, The Licensing of Technology Under the United
States Antitrust Laws, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 931, 936 (1971) (which the
Guide expressly cites on the point).
10 Joint ventures comprise only four of the 14 cases discussed,
which cover a wide variety of arrangements between firms in inter-
national trade (including multinational affiliates, foreign acquisitions
and mergers, patent and technology licensing, and joint action in-
volving foreign governments).
" Enforcement emphasis on joint ventures between competitive
firms is consistent with treatments by commentators. See K. BREW-
STER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 200-223 (1958) (dis-
cussion of joint ventures confined to those between competitors or
potential competitors); and see 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
113-114 (1978) (preliminary discussion of problems in joint ventures
between competitors and potential competitors). See also Antitrust
Guide, supra note 2, at 20 (care advised in policing operations of
joint ventures between competitors and potential competitors).
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loss of the parents as potential entrants into the joint venture
market and (2) increased probability of collusion between the
parents in their home market, facilitated by the joint ven-
ture.1" The decided cases have involved permanent joint ven-
tures between parents individually capable of market entry.
The question posed in the Guide's hypothetical case is whether
a more lenient rule applies if the joint venture is limited in its
term of existence and if the parents are not capable of in-
dividual market entry?
In Case C the joint venture is a joint bidding consortium
involving a single project, and made up of firms, several of
them competing, drawn from three industries. The venture is
both limited in time and necessary for market entry. Formed
to undertake a large hydroelectric project in Latin America,
the consortium includes three of the six largest electrical
equipment manufacturers, three of the eight largest engineer-
ing firms, and one of only two hydroelectric generator manu-
facturers.
The antitrust issues are (1) whether creation of the joint
venture restrained competition, (2) whether collateral agree-
ments are present that in themselves are unreasonably restric-
tive, and (3) whether the joint venture involves a "bottleneck"
foreclosure problem. The Antitrust Guide concludes that for-
mation of the joint venture was economically necessary be-
cause a smaller group would have lacked financial and tech-
nical capability and perhaps would have been unwilling to
assume the political risk. Under these circumstances and given
the limited purpose and duration of the joint venture, the De-
partment would almost surely view the joint venture as justi-
12 See Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 459-461.
Both theories have been criticized as unsound in application to
joint ventures. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE 115-116 (1976) (potential competition injury) and Whipple, Pro-
blems of Combination-Integration, Intra-Corporate Conspiracy and
Joint Ventures, 1958 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM (N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n.) 34, 53 (CCH 1958) (spillover collusion). The Antitrust Guide
(properly) does not assume the task of reevaluating the wisdom of
the behavioral premises of existing joint venture law.
341
THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN
fied even had its operations been entirely domestic."3 Legality
becomes clearer still where, as in Case C, the consortium in-
volves purely foreign operations because "normally" the
Department will not challenge a joint venture which at most
reduces competition in a foreign market; for such a case in-
volves no injury to either consumers or producers within the
United States."
Under the Guide's analysis the only appreciable antitrust
risks, therefore, are spillover collusion and bottleneck exclu-
sion. Spillover collusion between the parents into other areas
of their operations must be considered since several of the
parents are competitors. To reduce the risk of spillover collu-
sion, the Guide advises firms to "use special care in policing
the operation of a joint venture involving actual or potential
13 It should be noted that none of the parents was the largest
firm in its industry (a characteristic also present in the other joint
venture cases discussed in the Guide). This might be interpreted as
leaving open the possibility that the Guide would operate more strin-
gently against a joint venture that includes the ranking firm in a
concentrated marked. Mitigating this restrictive interpretation is the
fact that the actual transaction from which Case C was drawn in-
volved Antitrust Division approval of a consortium that included the
largest firm in an important industry. See Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Remarks on the Antitrust Guide for International Operations, ABA
Sections on International Law and Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law, in New York City, at p. 3 (Aug. 9, 1978).
4 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 21. The Guide further points
out that since the joint venture may not be engaged in commerce,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act "frequently does not apply," although
Section 1 of the Sherman Act remains applicable under the broader
"affecting commerce" standard. Id.
It should be noted that formation of the joint venture in Case C,
despite its foreign situs, would be subject to the premerger notifica-
tion requirements of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §18a. Notification is
required when inter alia the acquiring person is engaged in com-
merce (or its activities affect commerce). Ibid. Here the parents are
the acquiring persons and are clearly engaged in commerce. Ap-
plicability of the premerger notification requirements to joint ven-
tures is made explicit in the FTC's Premerger Notification Rules. See
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 320 (Feb. 16, 1978) §801.40.
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competitors." 11 Indeed, where a joint venture is long-lasting, it
may even be advisable to staff the joint venture with separate
personnel to reduce day-to-day contact between the parents.16
A joint venture may also transgress the antitrust laws if it has
"bottleneck" properties, i.e., if it forecloses competitors from
an essential facility or requirement. A limited term consor-
tium would, however, rarely, if ever, pose such a problem; in
fact, the Department knew of no application of the bottleneck
doctrine to a short term consortium.1 7
The Guide's analysis clarifies to some degree an area
marked by absence of legal precedent, and one increasingly
important in high technology and large capital projects, both
within and without the United States. The discussion suggests
that limited term, single project joint ventures will generally
be permitted, and most certainly in foreign markets, where (1)
the joint ventures includes substantially less than all firms
within an industry, (2) the project is beyond the capability of
any single parent or smaller subset of parents, i" (3) duration
of the joint venture is limited to the life of the project that
called it forth, and (4) some positive efforts are taken to struc-
ture the management and day-to-day operations of the joint
', Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 20.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 21-22. In its discussion of a subsequent case, however,
the Guide appears to treat the bottleneck doctrine as applicable to a
limited term joint venture. See Antitrust Guide at 58-61 (Case M)
and infra notes 41-45 and related text. Moreover, even in the discus-
sion of Case C the Guide finds it necessary to discount the possibil-
ity that the joint venture had bottleneck properties as to non-in-
cluded firms (suggesting that if competitors of the parents wished to
participate in the bidding they might form a competitive con-
sortium).
18 Lack of capability appears to be interpreted broadly in the
Guide to include not only absence of technological capability, but
also lack of financial capability, and ability to achieve scale
economies and risk spreading. See generally, Antitrust Guide, supra
note 2, at 19-21. One suspects, however, that lack of capability may
be viewed more expansively in foreign than in domestic markets.
343
THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN
venture to minimize risks of spillover collusion between
parents who are themselves competitors.
UNLIMITED TERM MARKET EXTENSIONS
An unlimited term market extension joint venture between
large, competitive firms in concentrated markets is apt to
raise more serious antitrust questions. Particularly is this so
when the joint venture amounts to a market extension as to
both parents, for then, as we have seen, the precedents have
identified both potential competition and collusion spillover
risks.19 When, however, the joint venture is a market exten-
sion as to one parent only, antitrust analysis is less well ar-
ticulated; and it is this problem which the Antitrust Guide
discusses.
Case E involves a joint venture to manufacture transistors
in Japan formed by a U.S.-based manufacturer of transistors
and a Japanese-based manufacturer of other types of elec-
tronic equipment. Thus, the joint venture is a market exten-
sion as to the U.S. parent and a product extension as to the
Japanese parent. Each of the parents would have faced sub-
stantial entry barriers in attempting individually to enter the
Japanese transistor market: the U.S. parent had high costs
and the Japanese parent lacked production know-how. Under
these circumstances formation of the joint venture appeared
to be a business necessity for both parents, notwithstanding
the fact that the U.S. parent was the third ranking firm,
holding 22% of a highly concentrated domestic transistor
market, and the Japanese parent was one of that country's
"largest industrial combines."20 The plan was that the joint
venture would manufacture transistors in Japan, using the
U.S. parent's technical know-how and the Japanese parent's
knowledge of the local market. Because the joint venture's
manufacturing costs would be below those of its U.S. parent,
9 See, supra, text at note 12.
20 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 28.
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the latter also insisted on a collateral agreement that neither
the joint venture nor the other (Japanese) parent would export
transistors to the United States or to certain designated
foreign markets presently being served by the U.S. parent.
Under the Antitrust Guide's analysis, formation of the
joint venture, as distinct from the collateral agreement, would
not in itself violate the antitrust laws. There is no injury to
existing competition since the parents are not competitors,
and the joint venture does not appear to be part of any
broader anticompetitive arrangement. While formation of the
joint venture could arguably injure potential competition
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, considering the Japanese
parent's potential to enter the United States transistor
market, such a theory would face at least two severe dif-
ficulties as applied to an international transaction. Section 7
may be inapplicable since it is unclear that the acquired firm
(the joint venture) is engaged in commerce, as required by the
statute. 1 Moreover, if there are other large or significant
foreign firms presently producing transistors, the Japanese
parent may not qualify as one of the few most probable
market entrants into the United States market."
A more serious antitrust problem is presented by the col-
lateral agreement protecting the U.S. parent's present tran-
sistor markets, domestic and foreign, from competition by
either the Japanese parent or the joint venture. These restric-
tions constitute an express division of geographic markets, in-
cluding the United States domestic market, and can be
2 See note 14 supra.
2 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 28-29. In addition, if Section
7 of the Clayton Act is inapplicable for jurisdictional reasons, it
seems unlikely that a joint venture which would at most foreclose
potential market entry by only one parent would be held unlawful
under the Sherman Act. Indeed, the potential competition doctrine
as applied to single firm market entry has caused the government
difficulties enough even under the more flexible standards of the
Clayton Act. See generally, Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers:
A Structural Syntheses, 87 YALE L.J. 1 (1977).
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justified only as necessary to assure formation of the joint
venture. Arguably in Case E the collateral restrictions
facilitate transfer to the joint venture of valuable knowledge
or know-how vital to the joint enterprise and presently solely
in the hands of the U.S. parent. Are such restrictions
necessary?
The Guide places the burden of proof on the defendants to
establish both that the know-how transferred has substantial
value, and that the restraint is no greater in scope or duration
than is "necessary to prevent frustration" of the underlying
joint venture and licensing arrangement.2" The Guide suggests
that the reasonableness of the duration of a technology shar-
ing restriction may be measured by reference to what is called
"the reverse engineering period"-the length of time it would
take the restricted firm to develop the know-how on its own. 4
Since in Case E the restriction is permanent, it clearly exceeds
the reverse engineering period and is therefore excessive. In-
deed, since the technology is changing rapidly, only a "short
term" restriction is deemed appropriate by the Guide.25
The Department does not indicate what it means by "short
term" restriction, nor for that matter by what standard one
might determine whether a geographic restriction is reason-
able in scope. Moreover, determination of the reverse en-
gineering period seems fraught with difficulty in view of the
23 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 31.
24 Id. The reverse engineering concept was apparently taken from
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), which con-
tained merely a passing reference to the fact that trade secret law
does not protect against discovery of a secret by "fair and honest
means" such as reverse engineering, "that is by starting with the
known product and working backward to divine the process which
aided in its development and manufacture." Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron, supra at 476. See also Douglas E. Rosenthal, Department of
Justice Antitrust Guide for International Operations on Interna-
tional Know-How Arrangements, remarks to ABA Section on Cor-
poration, Banking and Business Law in New York City (Dec. 15,
1978).
25Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 31.
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high technical complexity and uncertainty of the concept. 26
One senses, therefore, that more precise standards of scope
and duration for ancillary restraints remain to be worked out.
Most especially this is true of ancillary arrangements involv-
ing transfers of know-how and process patents, where impor-
tant principles of antitrust law, most notably the extent to
which restrictions can be placed on licensee production of un-
patented end products, are themselves in a state of flux en-
tirely apart from joint venture aspects." And clearly attempts
to reinforce the territorial restraints, imposed on the joint
venture by customer restrictions on its sales to third parties
who import the end product into the United States, would
raise grave questions. 8
Finally, a caveat seems in order as to the Guide's sugges-
tion that "different considerations" might apply if the joint
26 It is nevertheless defended by the chief of the Antitrust Divi-
sion's Foreign Commerce Section as "theoretically accessible to a
factfinder through expert testimony," despite difficulties. Rosenthal,
supra note 24, at 7. Compare Kirkpatrick and Mahinka, Antitrust
and the International Licensing of Trade Secrets and Know-How: A
Need for Guidelines, 9 LAW AND POLICY INT'L. Bus. 725, 743-744
(1977) (concept "generally very helpful, but ... of limited utility in
certain contexts as. . . where there is no realistic possibility that the
licensee could ever develop the technology transferred . . .") and
Fugate, Antitrust Guide, supra note 8, at 673-674 ("a new concept...
neither firmly rooted in logic nor of much help to businessmen
because of its limited nature").
27 See United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohlr, HmbH, 1978-2
TRADE CASES (CCH) 162,291 (D.D.C. 1978) (restriction on sale of un-
patented end products produced under process patent held unlawful
under Sherman Act); Rosenthal, supra note 24 (analysis in Case E
"arguably too permissive" in light of Studiengesellschaft, but never-
theless distinction between know-how licenses and process patent
licenses remains possible). See generally, Kirkpatrick & Mahinka,
supra note 26.
28 See Rosenthal, supra note 24, at 10 ("almost never to be
justified under a rule of reason standard"). See also Kirkpatrick &
Mahinka, supra note 26, at 738-739 (non-territorial restrictions in
know-how exchanges).
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venture were under the control of the U.S. parent with the
Japanese parent having a minority rather than a joint-
controlling interest.29 While in a literal sense the statement
may be correct, the possible implication that placing control in
one parent radically changes the competitive analysis seems
too strong. The joint venture significantly alters the com-
petitive incentives of the parties so long as the non-controlling.
parent has a substantial economic interest in the joint enter-
prise, and the restrictive effects of collateral restrictions re-
main. 0
Despite these uncertainties some principles do emerge
from Case E (construed against the background of prior law)
as to unlimited term market extensions. First, when the joint
venture is a market extension as to both parents (i.e., both
parents are already in the joint venture's product market), a
significant issue of potential competition injury is likely to be
present," as well as collusion risk when the parents are
themselves competitors. Second, when the joint venture is a
market extension as to only one parent and neither parent ap-
pears capable of unilateral entry, formation of a joint venture
will generally be permissible. Third, agreements restricting
competition between the joint venture affiliates will be per-
mitted only to the extent the parties can demonstrate that the
restrictions are indispensable to the formation of the joint
venture. Fourth, even when a competitive restriction can be
justified, it must be limited in time; and in general the shorter
the limitation, the better.
29 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 32.
30 See Rosenthal, supra note 24, at 11-12 (noting with specific
reference to Case E, competitive dangers when non-controlling
foreign parent is significant potential entrant into U.S. market).
' In the two parent potential entry case injury to potential com-
petition has been recognized as a basis for antitrust liability not only
under the Clayton Act but also under the Sherman Act. See United
States v. National Lead, 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y., 1945), modified
and aff'd., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); and see generally, Brodley, Joint
Ventures, supra note 1, at 459-460 (Sherman Act cases collected).
348
JOINT VENTURES
VERTICAL JOINT VENTURES
Vertical joint ventures between large competitors or poten-
tial competitors in concentrated markets raise antitrust risks
because the joint venture directly eliminates competition be-
tween the parents either in downstream sales or upstream
purchases. Downstream joint ventures have long been suspect
as between parents having market power since such joint ven-
tures typically involve the marketing of the parents' output,
and thus by necessity price fixing and market division.32 But
the legal decisions have taken a less hostile view of the
upstream joint venture, which generally involves production of
some common input utilized by the parents.33 The Antitrust
Guide focuses on two types of upstream joint ventures: a joint
research venture involving problems of competitor collabora-
tion and a risk-sharing joint venture involving problems of
bottleneck exclusion. These are among the strongest asserted
justifications for joint ventures, and thus the Guide's teaching
as to when even these joint ventures run into antitrust prob-
lems can be particularly instructive.
Joint Research
Joint research activity among firms in the same industry,
but operating in distinct geographic markets, is the subject of
the joint venture in Case D. The parents of the joint venture
are major producers of an end product called "X-metal," which
is manufactured from X-ore. One parent is the second largest
producer of X-metal in the United States and the other is one
32 See e.g., Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969) and United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
150-153 (1948); see generally Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 1,
at 456-457; 466-470.
33 See United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
and see generally Davidow, Antitrust Foreign Policy and Interna-
tional Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L.J. 268 (1974).
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of the largest producers in the Common Market.3 4 The joint
venture, which is to be formed in the United Kingdom, will
conduct all research for the parents aimed at discovering a
method of producing the X-metal from a new and more abun-
dant raw material source. Research success could thus have
large competitive significance in both raw material and end-
product markets. Prior to formation of the joint venture the
parents and several other X-metal producers were engaged in
similar research, at least at a preliminary stage. No re-
searcher, however, had developed a workable process. In form-
ing the joint venture the parties agreed that should the joint
venture succeed, the resulting process patent and know-how
rights would be divided between the parents: the U.S. parent
would receive an exclusive license for North America, and the
Common Market parent an exclusive license for Europe and
certain other foreign areas.
In analyzing Case D the Antitrust Guide recognizes no
blanket immunity for research joint ventures. Indeed, the
analytic approach is similar to that applied to other types of
joint ventures, the issues being elimination of existing com-
petition between the parents, unreasonable collateral
restraints, and bottleneck foreclosure. 5
Necessarily, the joint venture will eliminate research com-
petition between the parents in what is clearly a competitively
significant undertaking. Since the parents are large firms in
concentrated markets and the number of other research-
capable and motivated firms is limited, detailed inquiry is
necessary to determine whether the joint venture will be in-
jurious to long-run competition in the X-metal industry itself.
"I Case D does not explicitly state whether the parents are actual
or potential competitors as to the end product. But the facts that X-
metal is presumably heavy, that the parents are geographically dis-
tant and that their relative size in the United States and Common
Market are separately described, all suggest that competition is
essentially, or mainly, potential rather than actual.
35 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 23. The third issue is not ap-
plicable on the facts presented in Case D.
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Under the Guide's analysis this breaks down into three sub-
sidiary questions: (1) whether research costs and risks are so
high that without the joint venture the research would not be
undertaken by the parents; (2) whether the joint venture is
sufficiently limited in time and scope; and (3) whether other
firms in the industry are sufficiently engaged in comparable
research to provide "continuing competitive incentives."36
These factors are found to be satisfied in Case D, but the
facts supplied are so sparse that one must conclude that either
a modest showing will suffice or, more probably, that the
Department has made very little commitment as to what con-
stitutes a sufficient justification for an R & D joint venture.
Thus, as to the first factor (prohibitive individual research
costs), both parents were in fact already engaged in pre-
liminary research. Hence the most that could be asserted is
that the parents would not have undertaken as much research
in the absence of the joint venture, a fact uniquely ill-suited as
a basis for a legal standard.
The second factor (limitation of time and scope) seems less
troublesome since a research joint venture can, as in Case D,
be limited to a specific research goal. An appropriately limited
scope may at least implicitly limit the duration of the joint
venture, there being no reason to continue the venture beyond
the life of the specific research project. This, however, should
not be left to implication; it should be made explicit.
Turning to the third factor (significant research competi-
tion from other firms), it is clear that a complete absence of
research competition, such as would result from an industry-
wide joint venture, would be a strong presumptive reason
against a joint venture. 7 Assuming that some research com-
36 Id. at 25.
31 In this connection the Antitrust Guide reflects the current,
stringent view toward industry-wide research. In past years the An-
titrust Division viewed such research more permissively if the
research results were made available to the whole industry. See
Fugate, Antitrust Guide, supra note 8, at 665-666.
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petition remains, however, it is unclear what the quantum
must be in order to escape antitrust censure. The Antitrust
Guide states only that "other leading U.S. and foreign firms
will continue to parallel the efforts of the joint venture" and
that this will provide a "competitive spur," as well as weaken
any inference that the venture is "a device for restraining
competitive research.""8 We are given no information as to
either the number or vitality of the other research efforts ex-
cept that the firms involved are large (but then so were the
parents who were presumable ineffective in their separate
research).
Thus, it is difficult to draw from the discussion of Case D
more than certain threshold conditions for a permissible joint
research undertaking between large competitors or potential
competitors in concentrated markets. These appear to be
simply that (1) the research task is of sufficiently high cost or
risk that the parents can reasonable establish that they would
not have undertaken the research individually, (2) the joint
venture is confined to that research task, (3) formation of the
joint venture will not eliminate or preclude all competitive
research in the industry, and (4) no special risk of collusive
spillover between the parents is present.
In addition to the joint research venture in Case D, there
is present a collateral agreement covering process patents and
know-how discovered by the joint venture. Under this agree-
ment the joint venture is required to assign to each parent for
use within its home territory, an exclusive territorial license to
process patents and know-how discovered by the joint venture.
As we have seen above, the antitrust status of process patents
and know-how licensing agreements is in itself a difficult and
unsettled legal question. 9 The fact that such agreements are
contained within a joint venture context weaves a third,
potentially competitive entity into the network of agreements,
38 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 24.
19 See, supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, and see gener-
ally Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, supra note 26.
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and focuses attention on whether the whole is more restrictive
of long-run competition than is necessary. More specifically, if
there is already some legal doubt as to the legality of restric-
tions on end-product sales by licensees of process patents and
know-how, the addition of a joint venture as an additional
party to the licensing arrangement cannot improve the com-
petitive picture. Not only is the joint venture itself likely to be
subject to territorial and perhaps other restraints, but
management and operation of the joint enterprise is typically
under the dual control of parents, who are likely themselves
to be actual or potential competitors. Noting the latter
possibility, the Guide expresses concern as to the risk of
spillover collusion in research joint ventures and appears to
call for some specific steps by the parties to assure that there
is no discussion of production and marketing subjects.4"
Risk Sharing and Bottleneck Exclusion
Vertical joint ventures may, in addition to reducing com-
petition between the parties, raise the problem of bottleneck
exclusion. In Case M several major domestic and foreign oil
companies, concerned about continued access to low sulphur
oil from concessions in Third World countries, form a joint
venture to share the political risk of possible interruptions of
their oil supply. The joint venture, to be located abroad, would
assure a continued supply of low sulphur oil in the event of in-
terruption, through back-up commitments from outside
sources. Under these circumstances neither the formation of
the joint venture nor collateral agreements pose significant an-
titrust problems."' Formation of the joint venture is essential
40 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 27. Specific reference is made
to Case C, and precautions are suggested to avoid spillover collusion,
e.g., separate personnel for joint venture "to reduce day-to-day con-
tact." Id. at 20. The problem is particularly acute if the parents are
actual competitors as to end-product sales, in which case a corporate
structure to maintain maximum separation of joint venture and
parents may be advisable.
"1 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 58-61.
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in view of both the high risks which it serves to reduce and
the limited purpose of the joint undertaking. 2 Since there are
also no objectionable collateral agreements, the only substan-
tial antitrust issue is bottleneck exclusion.
A bottleneck problem arises because the three American
participants in the joint venture wish to exclude another
American company ("Maverick") which also operates conces-
sions in the area. The crucial issue in resolving the legality of
this exclusion is whether the joint venture supplies an essen-
tial input to Maverick, the absence of which will place it "at
serious disadvantage."4 Thus, if an assured source of low
sulphur crude is essential to Maverick and no feasible substi-
tute source is available to it on roughly comparable terms, the
bottleneck rule would apply: Maverick would be entitled to ac-
cess to the low sulphur crude on a non-discriminatory basis.
This result is consistent with past decisions on bottleneck joint
ventures, though it should be noted that the decided cases
have been concerned with permanent joint ventures, as dis-
tinct from a limited term joint venture, as present here. 4 But
no reason appears for not applying the bottleneck rule to pre-
vent severely damaging exclusions from limited term, as well
as permanent, joint ventures.
14 This conclusion is qualified by the suggestion that since the
joint venture has a limited purpose, "prudence would dictate" that
the venture be given a fixed termination date to assure that it does
not move into impermissible collaboration after its original purpose
has expired. Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 58-59.
As a factual matter one may question whether in today's world the
purpose and need to obtain an assured supply of oil from Third
World countries will ever have a cut-off or termination time. Still it
may be better practice to include a termination date, there being
nothing to prevent a future extension of the joint venture's life if
the parties require it.
"I Id. at 60.
4 See generally Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at
468-469; Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 58-60, nn.107-113 (citing
cases).
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Admission of the excluded Maverick to the benefits of the
joint venture, including membership, would be required, it ap-
pears, even if the reasons for exclusion were non-invidious. It
is therefore an aggravating factor that the motives for ex-
cluding Maverick are objectionable in themselves, being based
on Maverick's competitive behavior as an "unpredictable fac-
tor" and a source of supply to independent U.S. refiners.45
This, of course, makes the case for Maverick's compulsory ac-
cess to the joint venture even stronger, and negates any good
faith defense.
The Guide's treatment of Case M adds little to existing
doctrine as to joint ventures with bottleneck properties. Per-
haps of most importance is that it makes explicit the Depart-
ment's view that a limited term joint venture may be exclu-
sionary if the input is essential. Determining whether an input
is essential will, however, sometimes be difficult, particularly
when the shared risk is an uncertain political risk, as in Case
M. This may explain the Guide's emphasis on the motives for
exclusion, and suggests that when the effect of the exclusion
is less than clear-cut, intent evidence may be determinative.
Even when exclusion is unjustified, however, the remedy is
not to dissolve the joint venture, but to require admission of
the excluded party. (Of course, this will not solve the existing
parties' treble damage problems covering the period of exclu-
sion.)
CONCLUSION
Focusing on three poorly illuminated areas of joint venture
law, the Antitrust Guide finds scope in international transac-
tions for lawful activity, even as among competitors having
market power. Limiting somewhat the implications of the
Guide's analysis is the fact that discussion is focused entirely
in terms of specific and simplified hypothetical cases. Never-
4 Antitrust Guide, supra note 2, at 57.
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theless, in the three undeveloped areas of joint venture law
discussed, short term consortia, one-parent market extensions
and upstream vertical joint ventures, any statement of views
by the Department of Justice, however guarded and qualified,
adds significantly to our knowledge of enforcement policy.
Moreover, notwithstanding the limiting specificity of the
discussion, certain general conclusions may be drawn. First, it
appears that the indispensable precondition for the lawfulness
of a joint venture between competitors with market power (in
the three areas analyzed) is a showing that the venture is
necessary and required in order for the parents to enter a new
market or embark on a new enterprise or undertaking. Se-
cond, even in that event, the joint venture is to be allowed
only such scope and term of existence as may be required to
accomplish its legitimating purpose. Third, throughout its
allotted life, however short, the joint venture is subject to par-
ticularized scrutiny by enforcement agencies to assure that
collateral agreements and joint venture generally remain con-
fined to the legitimated channel of activity. All of this is to
say that for a joint venture in international trade between
competitive or potentially competitive firms having market
power a course of lawful activity will often exist, but the path
must be chosen with care. This is a lesson not without instruc-
tiveness for antitrust counsel to domestic as well as interna-
tional joint ventures.
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